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FINDING THE BROKER'S PLACE IN THE TYPICAL
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION
BARRY A. CuREm*

The real estate broker's place in the residential real estate conveyancing

process is not well understood. The law most often casts the broker as the
seller's legal agent. This does not always accord with the expectations of home
sellers and buyers about the broker's function; indeed, brokers themselves frequently take a broader view of their role than the law of agency implies. A
broker who disregards the law's proscriptions, however, and seeks to fulfill the
parties' expectations risks sanction if a disappointed seller or buyer later complains. Should fear of penalty lead the broker to keep his conduct within the
boundaries of agency law, the parties to a transaction, particularly the buyer,
may be denied the aid and counsel they need and expect from the broker.
Disparity between the legal model imposed on brokers and the expectations
of the parties creates a dilemma for brokers and prompts consumer uncertainty about the broker's role. The law governing the real estate broker's place
in a residential real estate transaction and the expectations of sellers and buyers
about the broker's role need reconciliation. Given our society's emphasis on
homeownership,1 it is peculiar that brokers are allowed to provide the parties
*Professor of Law, University of Florida. A.B., 1968, University of California, Los Angeles;
J.D., 1971, University of Southern California.
1. The Housing Act of 1949, calling for "a decent home and suitable living environment
for every American family. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §1441 (1976), reflects an underlying commitment
to homeownership. Owning a home is often described as "the American dream." See, e.g.,
Rubinowitz & Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American Dream: Implementing Fair
Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 Nw. U.L. Rav. 491, 601 (1979);
Sengstock & Sengstock, Homeownership: A Goal for All Americans, 46 J. Uan. LAw-313, 317
(1969). See generally R. MONTGOMERY & D. MANDELKER, HOUSING iN AmmucA: PROBLEMS AND
Pnis'Ernvas (2d ed. 1979); Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARtv. C.R. - C.L. L. REv. 207, 223-25 (1970). Much of the development of the law
of zoning concerns protecting and promoting homeownership, particularly in single-family
neighborhoods. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 258 (1977);
cf. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 NJ. 151, 173-91,
336 A.2d 713, 724-34, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
Our laws protect and encourage homeownership in a number of ways. Homestead exemptions safeguard a debtor's house from the claims of many creditors. See Maines & Maines, Our
Legal Chameleon Revisited: Florida'sHomestead Exemption, 30 U. FLA. L. Rv. 227, 228-32,
264-65 (1978). Homeowners may be afforded greater protection in the mortgage foreclosure
process than other borrowers. Leipziger, Deficiency Judgments in California: The Supreme
Court Tries Again, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 753 (1975). Homeownership is encouraged by the
legal system in many ways, including allowing federal income tax deductions for mortgage
interest payments and local property taxes. I.R.C., §§163, 164. In 1979 these deductions totalled
$5,550,000,000 and $5,180,000,000 respectively. Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Con.
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most of the guidance in the real estate conveyancing process. Surprisingly, the
literature contains little scholarly writing focusing on this problem.
This article starts by examining the tension between the law and the
parties' hopes in a brief description of the broker's participation in a typical
residential real estate transaction. Then the discussion focuses on several
hypothetical situations that explore the extent to which the broker can fulfill
the parties' needs for assistance within the confines of existing law and regulation. Finally, alternative legal models that might provide a more appropriate
way of regulating the broker's place in the ordinary residential real estate
transaction are considered.
A PERSPECrIVE ON THE ROLE
OF THE REAL ESTATE BROKER
Most persons initiate residential real estate transactions by contacting a
real estate broker.2 The broker generally knows the local housing market, is
experienced in the conveyancing process, and can present a house to many
potential buyers. Sellers may consequently seek local brokers in an effort to
obtain the timely sale of their property at the maximum price, on favorable
cept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L. REv. 225, 356 (1979). When
combined, these tax expenditures are the second largest subsidy provided by the federal government to individual taxpayers. Id. Fair housing legislation, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1968,
42 U.S.C. §§3601-3619, 3631 (1976), guarantees access to housing for all persons without regard
to race, creed or sex.
2. "Broker" is used in this article as a generic term to describe both the real estate broker
and the real estate salesperson. All fifty states require licensing as a condition to lawfully
acting as either a real estate broker or real estate salesperson. P. GOLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE
TRANSAcrIONs 29 (1980). Real estate brokering consists of a person acting for another for
compensation in the negotiation or attempted negotiation of the sale, purchase, exchange or
rental of any interest in real property. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §475.01(3) (1981). Although
qualifications for licensing vary, typically the broker's license is more difficult to obtain than
a salesperson's license. For example, in Florida a person must complete a 51-hour course and
pass an examination to be licensed as a real estate salesperson. Id. §475.17(2). To qualify for
a broker's license, a person must have twelve months experience as a licensed salesperson in
the office of a registered broker, take an additional 48-hour course, and pass another examination. Id. Salespersons can perform most brokerage services, but they must be employed by,
and act under the supervision of, a licensed broker. Id. §475.01(4). Nothing prohibits a person
licensed as a broker from acting as a salesperson for another broker or for a business association acting as a broker. In a large real estate brokerage firm many persons may be licensed as
brokers although the business may be registered only in the names of the partners or a few
of the active members. It is difficult to generalize about what brokerage activities cannot be
performed by salespersons. In Wisconsin, for example, a salesperson can only prepare listing
agreements, residential leases and offers to purchase, not contracts for sale. Brokers can also
prepare contracts of sale and other documents using certain approved forms. Rules of the
Wisconsin Real Estate Examining Board 7.01(2), reprinted in STATE OF WISCONSIN, WISCONSIN
REAL ESTATE LAW (1976).
Realtors are brokers who belong to the National Association of Realtors, which is the
largest brokers' trade group. It has been active through local boards of realtors in operating
multiple listing services and other aspects of the real estate business. Austin, Real Estate
Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1326-28
(1970); Minard, Real Estate - Why George Babbitt Should be Smiling in His Grave, FORBES,
Sept. 4, 1978, at 43.
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terms. Brokers may thus be able to help sellers achieve their objectives in the
real estate market and guard the seller from having to exert great personal
effort.
Buyers enlist the aid of brokers for more complex and varied reasons. Apprehension concerning a home-buying decision leads many buyers to seek the
expert help of a broker. Home ownership continues to be an important personal goal for most Americans. 3 A house is often regarded as a good investment,
perhaps the best one the average person can make.4 The location of the home,
moreover, influences a person's choice of friends, the quality of the education
one's children will receive, and other aspects of individual lifestyle.,
Potential buyers may also be concerned about purchasing a home because of
the high transactional costs associated with real estate transactions.6 Inspecting
a house for defects is often financially impossible7 and the conveyancing
3. W. GRIGSBY & L. ROSENBURG, URBAN HOUSING POLICY 105-111 (1975); Sengstock &
Sengstock, supranote 1, at 318-26.
4. A study by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America concluded that a family
should buy a home rather than renting it and putting the money otherwise required for
a down payment and dosing costs into some other investment. After three years the purchaser
of a median-price home would be almost $35,000 wealthier than renters who invested their
money in certificates of deposit yielding eight percent compounded. An annual ten percent
appreciation in home values was assumed. The report further found that single family housing
was the best hedge against inflation during the period from 1968-1978. [1980] 8 Hous. & DEV.
REP. (BNA) 152-58. See S. SEmEL, HoUsiNG CosTS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION 9-18 (1978).
Housing prices increased 17 percent from March, 1979, to March, 1980, faster than the overall
price increase of 14.7 percent. [1980] 7 Hous. & DEy. EP,. (BNA) 1021. Over a ten year period
ending in 1978, median housing prices more than doubled. Minard, supra note 2, at 42.
5. Economists and other social scientists have determined that individuals will pay more
to obtain housing in areas that offer convenience to work and shopping, high quality public
schools, and desirable environments. See, e.g., M. DANIELSON, THE PoLrrics OF EXCLUSiON 1-49
(1976); J. KAIN & J. QuiGLEY, HousING MARMEs AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A MCROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 231-55 (1975); A. KING, PROPERTY TAXES, AMENMES, AND RISmENTIAL LAND VALUES
54-65, 85-94 (1973); Li & Brown, Micro-Neighborhood Externalities and Hedonic Housing
Prices, 56 LAND EcoN. 125 (1980). Cf. J. Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American
Cities 112-140 (1961). Exclusionary zoning and no-growth plans may be grounded on the
desire to protect neighborhood qualities. Judge Westenhaver recognized this over 50 years
ago in his perceptive opinion in Euclid. "The plain truth is that the true object of the
,ordinance . . . is to place all the property . . . in a strait-jacket. The purpose to be accomplished is really to regulate the mode of living of persons who may hereafter inhabit it.
In the last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify the population and segregate
them according to their income or situation in life ....
Aside from ... furthering such class
tendencies, the ordinance also has an esthetic purpose... to make this village develop into a
city along lines now conceived by the village council to be attractive and beautiful." Ambler
Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 807, 316 (N.D. Ohio, 1924), rev'd 272 U.S. 865 (1926).
See Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 961-62 (1st Cir. 1972).
6. Whitman, Home Transfer Costs: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 62 GEO. L.J. 1311
(1974).
7. This has been recognized at least with respect to new homes: "An experienced builder
who has erected and sold many houses is in a far better position to determine the structural
condition of a house than most buyers. Even if a buyer is sufficiently knowledgeable to
evaluate a home's condition, he rarely has access to make any inspection of the underlying
structural work, as distinguished from the merely cosmetic features." Duncan v. SchusterGraham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 444, 578 P.2d 637, 638-39 (1978). Uncertainty about the
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process is becoming increasingly complex. 8 In addition, individuals participate
in this market relatively infrequently during their lifetimes9 despite the
mobility of the population", and the high volume of real estate transactions. 1
The unfamiliarity of the process thus contributes to the anxiety many potential
home buyers feel when entering the real estate market.
Today, brokers often are the only group to which a home buyer can turn
for counsel and guidance in the home-buying process.'2 The manner in which
the broker-home buyer relationship evolves tends to encourage the typical
home buyer to believe that the broker can supply the counseling function.13 A
brief sketch of how this relationship typically develops shows how the buyer
can develop a reasonable reliance on the broker.
The broker-home buyer relationship often begins outside the context of the
sale of a particular home. The home buyer often calls a broker recommended
by a friend or business associate rather than selecting a broker from an advertisement. The relationship thus begins on a positive and personal basis as
well as a professional one. 14 No contract is signed which evidences the broker's
loyalty and confidence to the buyer, nor does the broker discuss his legal obligations and responsibilities in the transaction. Consequently, the buyer's original
quality of materials and workmanship has led to insurance programs covering losses due to
construction defects. Stanton, Consumer Protection and National Housing Policy: The Problem of New-Home Defects, 29 CASE W. RsS. L. REV. 527 (1979). For a discussion of the availability and desirability of inspection programs for used houses, see U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEV., A STUDY OF HOME INSPECTION AND WARRANTY PROGRAMS

(1977).

8. See SEIDEL, supra note 4, at 261-77; see generally, Gresham, The Residential Real Estate
Transfer Process: A Functional Critique, 23 EMORY L.J. 421 (1974).
9. Mobility among owners of homes is significantly less than among renters. J. KAiN &
J. QUIGLEY, supra note 5, at 129. Despite a high rate of mobility within the general population
and the fact that about 64 percent of all housing units are owner-occupied, U.S. DEP'T. OF
COMMERCE,

BUREAU

OF THE

CENSUS,

1979

STATISTICAL

ABSTRACT

OF THE

UNITED

STATES

782

[hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT], a family is not likely to make more than a few
home purchases during its existence. Id. at 122; Speare, Home Ownership, Life Cycle State and
Residential Mobility, 7 DEMOGRAPHY 449 (1970).
10. From 1975 to 1978 over one-third of the population of the United States changed
housing units. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT at 40. A study of mobility in St. Louis found that 39.3
percent of households sampled had moved within the preceding three years. J. KAIN &
J. QUIGLEY, supra note 5, at 129.
11. Approximately 4.7 million new and used homes were sold in 1978. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT at 791-92.

12. Brokers seldom resist the homeseeker's invitation to provide assistance. See Stambler
& Stein, The Real Estate Broker- Schizophrenia or Conflict of Interest, 28 D.C. B.J. 16, 17-18
(1961). Franchising of the real estate brokerage business, see Dowling & Hines, Here Comes the
Real Estate Franchise, 7 REAL ESTATE REv. 48 (1977), seems to have brought a significant increase in television commercials regarding broker's services. These appear to be aimed as
much at buyers as sellers. For instance, one pictures the broker wrapping the home buyer in
a protective blanket with the franchise symbol on it. Many of these ads suggest that buyers,
as well as sellers, can get the help they want from their local broker.
13. Austin, supra note 2, at 1327; Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing and
Efficiency in Residential Real Estate Markets, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931, 944-45 (1977).
14. Even if the broker is selected from the telephone book or other advertisement, the
home buyer usually chooses the broker, not the converse. The anxiety and lack of expertise a
home buyer feels probably induce the attribution of these friendly qualities to the broker.
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view may not change much as the relationship develops. The broker generally
requests a considerable amount of private information about the buyer's
financial position and personal tastes to develop an inventory of homes suitable
for the buyer's unique needs. The intimate and helpful nature of these discussions reinforces the buyer's attitude that the broker is friendly and worthy
of trust.
The broker and buyer spend a considerable amount of time together during
the often lengthy home search period. Inevitably, as several houses are visited,
comparisions will be made regarding floor plans, neighborhood character and
the like. The shared experience of buyer and broker makes the broker the
logical buyer's advisor as alternative courses are weighed and sifted. The
broker's advice is influential because of his expertise.
Current conveyancing practices involve the broker with the buyer beyond
the search-and-locate stage.15 A buyer may reasonably continue to rely on the
broker's assistance as the offer is formulated and the final contract negotiated.
The broker aids the buyer in preparing the offer that forms the basis of the
land sale contract between seller and buyer.16 Although the buyer can reject
the broker's aid and consult an attorney, time pressure may militate against
this.1 The buyer may also feel the broker is the best person to advise him.
Both sellers and buyers contact brokers to help them achieve their differing
goals in a real estate transactions. Sellers' objectives are straightforward and
not as dependent on the development of a personal relationship with the
broker for their success. Buyers' special needs, on the other hand, create a
15. D. BuRKE, AMRICAuN CONVEYANCING PATTERNS 21-22, 85-36 (1978). A few courts have
held that the broker does not earn the commission until the transaction is closed, rather than
upon procurement of a ready, willing and able seller. E.g., Thristram's Landing, Inc. v. Wait,
367 Mass. 622, 827 N.E.2d 727 (1975); Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d
843 (1967). This reflects the importance of the broker throughout the conveyancing process
rather than just during the time when buyer searches for a house.
16. The significance of this document should not be discounted. A.B.A., Tim PROPER
ROLE or THE LAYER IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 5-6 (1976). Contracts for the
sale of real estate are within the Statute of Frauds and must be in writing. UNIFORM LAND
TRANSACTIONS Acr §2-201. Courts have, however, upheld the validity as contracts of very brief
and sketchy writings which do not provide for many important aspects of a conveyance. In
some places, these documents are titled "deposit receipt" or "binder agreement." Buyers may
not fully comprehend the legal effect of this document given such a misleading heading. See
C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAW 493-503 (1977). Forms vary among communities.
Broker groups, bar associations and state agencies may work, alone or in combination, to
develop a form for local use. Gresham, supra note 8, at 484.
17. An uneasy truce continues between brokers and lawyers. Brokers perform tasks that
constitute giving legal advice, e.g., State v. Dinger, 14 Wis.2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
Brokers believe their training makes them competent to handle the standard transaction. They
fear delays and unnecessary complications if lawyers involve themselves to a much greater
extent then they do presently. Raushenbush, Who Helps the Home Buyer, 1979 AnIz. ST. L.J.
203, 205 (1979). In some states lawyers and brokers have agreed on a rough line of demarcation between legal work the broker can do and what is reserved for the attorney. Spelman,
Eight Years of "The Accord;"or All is Sunshine and Light in the Land of the BrokerLawyer,
64 ILI B.J. 42 (1975). For the history of the controversy, see Comment, Conveyancing- The
Roles of the Real Estate Broker and the Lawyer in Ordinary Real Estate TransactionsWherein Lies the PublicInterest, 19 DEPAUL L. REv. 319 (1969).
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reliance on brokers during the natural progression of the broker-buyer relationship.' s A broker, however experiences difficulty in performing the tasks expressly or impliedly entrusted to him by the buyer while remaining within the
legal rules currently governing his conduct.
REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND THE LAW OF AGENCY

In practice both home buyers and home sellers have legitimate claims to
the broker's loyalty. An analysis of agency law, however, reveals that the legal
system affords more favorable treatment and greater protection to the brokerseller relationship than to that of the broker-buyer. This greater protection is
derived from the legal effect. of the listing agreement between the seller and
broker, in which the seller promises to pay a commission to the broker thus
making the broker his agent.19 Regardless of both the amount of time the
broker and buyer spend together and the personal relationship that may de20
velop between them, the broker is seldom considered the buyer's agent.
In the majority of cases, a written, exclusive right-to-sell agreement establishes the agency relationship between seller and broker. Under this contract,
the seller promises to pay an agreed commission to the broker if the house sells
during the listing period. The commission must be paid whether the sale results from the efforts of the listing broker, another broker, or the seller.21 Other
forms of listing property with a broker are possible, 22 but brokers promote the
exclusive right to sell model, arguing that it assures the broker's best attention
and effort to sell the property. 23 In theory, sellers must count on the listing
broker's efforts under an exclusive right to sell agreement to avoid potential
liability for more than one commission. In practice, however, the listing broker
will agree to cooperate 24 with another broker and share the commission unless
18. Note, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 767, 772-73 (1978).
19. Sample listing contracts cart be found at A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND
TRANSFER AND FINANCE 1128-1129 (2d ed. 1978); Note, supra note 18 at 796.
20. See notes 39-47 and accompanying text infra.
21. E.g., Wade v. Austin, 524 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). Many exclusive right to
sell listings make the seller liable For a commission if the property is sold to someone who
was introduced to the house while the listing agreement was in force. E.g., Note, supra note
18 at 769. The seller is also liable for a commission if the property is withdrawn from sale
during the listing period without the broker's consent. Id. See also Blank v. Borden, II Cal. 3d
963, 524 P.2d 127, 115 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1974).
22. Two common forms of listing agreements are the open listing and the exclusive
agency. The seller promises to pay a commission in an open listing to a broker who procures
someone ready, willing and able to buy on terms acceptable to seller. Under an exclusive
agency listing, the seller owes a commission if the property is sold by any broker, but is not
liable for a commission if he sells the property himself. R, LIFTON, PRACTICAL REAL ESTATE:
LEGAL, TAX AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES 94-96 (1979); H. MILLER & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF
CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE 212-19 (1965).
23. Members of the National Association of Realtors are bound by Article 6 of the
organization's Code of Ethics to urge the owner to enter an exclusive listing agreement.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, INTERPRETATION OF THE CODE OF ETHICS 3a (7th ed. 1976).
24. Cooperation involves the listing broker agreeing with another broker to share the
commission the seller has agreed to pay in the exclusive listing agreement. This may be done
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the listing broker has another offer in hand; part of a certain commission is
better than the chance of a whole commission.
Cooperation among brokers is so sensible that it has become formalized in

the multiple listing services (MLS) 25 that permeate real estate markets across
the country. The MLS concept is simple - brokers agree to pool listings and
split commissions.26 Multiple listing services mitigate the harshness of exclusive
right-to-sell listing agreements. A seller's property is included in the inventory
of all MLS members by listing it with one, and the brokers' advance agreement
to cooperate effectively eliminates the potential double commission problem.

Buyers as well as sellers benefit from MLS operations. One MLS member
can show a house listed by any other member without having to arrange that
member's cooperation in advance. Given the substantial market share of many

multiple listing services, 27 the "one-stop shopping" method appears to be a very
efficient way to canvass available housing opportunities. Another consequence
of the MLS arrangement, however, is not so advantageous to buyers. The agreement to pool listings and share commissions creates ties among member brokers

28
that make each a sub-agent of every other member broker.
Once the broker becomes the seller's agent, 29 the law imposes certain duties

on the broker. Because of the agency relationship's fiduciary character, the
broker is subject to the duties of loyalty, honesty and full disclosure to his
when the listing broker is approached by another broker who has a person interested in the
property. Cases involving cooperation include Nutter v. Bechtel, 6 Ariz. App. 501, 433 P.2d
993 (1967); Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 537 P.2d 865, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975);
Cantor &Assoc., Inc. v. Devore, 281 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973).
25. Descriptions of the multiple listing service are given in Austin, supra note 2, at
1328-30; Comment, Exclusion from Real Estate Multiple Listing Services as Antitrust ViolaLions, 14 CAI. W.L. REv. 298, 300-03 (1978).
26. How the commission will be divided varies, but the broker who procures the buyer
will normally receive half or more of the commission. Multiple listing services have been
attacked for alleged price-fixing in violation of antitrust laws. Austin, supra note 2, at 1338-39;
[1980] 7 Hous. &D-v. REP. (BNA) 683. See generally Owen, supra note 13, at 944-49.
27. Fair Hous. Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing
Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976) (one-half of all Bergen County brokerage transactions involve the use of an MLS); Wheatly Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna
Resales Co., 447 F. Supp. 838 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (MLS listings for eleven months totaled 9,000
homes with sales in excess of $400 million).
28. See, e.g., Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wash. 2d 520, 527-28, 429 P.2d 864, 868-69 (1967);
Hale v. Wolfsen, 276 Cal. App. 2d 285, 290-91, 81 Cal. Rptr. 23, 27 (1969); Cooperation in Real
Estate Brokerage, 11 MAINE REAL ESTATE NEws, March 1978, at 3. Contra, Blockinger v.
Schlegel, 58 Ill. App. 3d 324,374 N.E.2d 491 (1978).
29. Agency is a consensual relationship between two persons wherein one of them, the
principal, empowers the other, the agent, to act and the agent assumes to so act. RESTATEmENT
(SEcoND)

OF AGENCY

§1 (1958); Defosses v. Notis, 333 A.2d 83 (Me. 1975). Generally, the

broker is a special agent, as opposed to a general one. A special agent represents the principal
in a discrete number of transactions without involving a continuity of service. RESTAT MENT
(SEcoND) OF AGENCY §3 (1958). Ingalls v. Rice, 511 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974);
Stenson v. Thrush, 36 Wash. 2d 726, 728, 219 P.2d 977, 978 (1950). The authority of the
broker is confined to selling a described piece of real property for a given price. See note 19
supra. In practice the broker does not sell the property but solicits offers and aids in negotiating a sale on terms acceptable to the seller.
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principal.3° These duties bind the agent because of the nature of an agency
arrangement and do not depend on the listing agreement's terms. 31 Basic
principles of agency law require the broker to disclose information to the
seller that would help him in the bargaining process. The broker must further
refrain from disclosing information to the buyer that would harm the seller,
unless failure to make the revelation amounts to fraud or misrepresentation.
The standard agency model works well for most purposes in the conveyancing process. It regulates the broker's behavior vis-a-vis the seller. For example,
the broker cannot secretly profit by buying property he has agreed to sell at a
bargain price and then reselling it at a profit.3 2 Self-dealing is not prohibited,
but the broker must disclose his intentions to deal personally in the property
and not take advantage of his superior knowledge to gain from the trust the
3
seller has reposed in him. 3
Although a broker may advise a seller of his opinions concerning offers received, the law clearly states that all such decisions are the seller's. Offers must
be communicated to the seller regardless of the broker's evaluation of whether
they should be accepted, rejected, or countered.34 A high standard of care applies to the broker's conduct regarding the accuracy and sufficiency of the advice.35 Failing to meet it, the broker risks possible disciplinary proceedings and
sanctions.36

In contrast to the seller's legal relationship with the broker, the home buyer's position is a perilous one. Reposing confidence and trust in the broker, the
buyer is potentially exposed to manipulation and exploitation. Brokers can
successfully meet a buyer's complaints about alleged mistreatment with a de30. See, e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 552-53, 236 A.2d 843, 856
(1967); Zwick v. United Farm Agency, Inc., 556 P.2d 508 (Wyo. 1976). See Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1343,
1356-57 (1972).
31. See Comment, supra note 30, at 1356-57.
32. E.g., Kline v. Pyms Suchman Real Estate Co., 303 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1974);
Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau of Olympia, Inc., 73 Wash. 2d 225, 437 P.2d 897 (1968).
33. Id.; CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 23, at 121-28.
34. E.g., Smith v. Zak, 20 Cal. App. 3d 785, 793, 98 Cal. Rptr. 242, 246-47 (1971); Simone
v. McKee, 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 312, 298 P.2d 667, 671 (1956); Hickam v. Colorado Real
Estate Comm'n, 534 P.2d 1220, 1224-25 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Bolding v. Lewis H. May Co.,
111 Misc. 170, 174-75, 181 N.Y.S. 121, 123 (1920).
35. See, e.g., Morley v. J. Pagel Realty & Ins., 27 Ariz. App. 62, 550 P.2d 1104 (1976);
Timmsen v. Forest E. Olson, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 3d 860, 870-72, 86 Cal. Rptr. 359, 365-67 (1970);
Ahern v. Florida Real Estate Comrn'n ex rel. O'Kelley, 149 Fla. 706, 6 So. 2d 857 (1942).
36. A broker may be denied his commission for not performing in a satisfactory manner
the duties owed to the seller-principal. See, e.g., Security Aluminum Window Mfg. Corp. v.
Lehman Assocs., Inc., 108 N.J. Super, 137, 260 A.2d 248 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970) (compensatory and punitive damages assessed against broker who led principal to believe that an
offer of only $25,000 had been made when in fact a $50,000 offer had been received). The
broker's license may be suspended or revoked for violation of a duty imposed on the broker
by law or contract, without regard to whether the victim of the misconduct sustained loss or
damage. FLA. STAr. §475.25(1) (1981). Additionally, members of the National Association of
Realtors can be penalized by their local board for violating that group's Code of Ethics.
Sanctions range from a reprimand to expulsion from the local chapter. CODE OF ETHICS, supra
note 23, at v-vii.
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fense based upon the law of agency. Of course, actions in fraud 7 and misrepresentation s afford some protection to the buyer. The buyer may alternatively
assert an express agency relationship exists between himself and the broker or
that mistreatment by a broker, while not amounting to fraud or misrepresentation, breaches duties owed to him even though he is not the broker's principal.
Establishing a formal agency relationship with a real estate broker, however,
will be difficult for the buyer. The seller's contractual arrangement with the
broker, because of its formality and an assumption that it arose first, may preempt any relationship buyer claims with the broker. The mere fact that the
listing agreement is in writing, however, should not elevate the broker-seller
relationship to a superior position;39 rather, the listing agreement should be
considered only one of many material facts necessary to determine who the
broker's principal was in a particular transaction." 0
The person whose relationship with the broker began first could assert a
stronger claim to the agent's loyalty. There is an unarticulated presumption
that the broker-seller relationship is the initial one. Buyers thus bear the
burden of overcoming this presumption; however, the presumption itself is
questionable. The home buyer and the broker may be working together prior
to the time the seller's house is listed. In tight real estate markets, a land sale
contract may be entered within hours or days of listing. It is unlikely that these
sudden sales result from the home buyer just happening into a broker's office
moments after the listing has been obtained.
A buyer's claim that the broker is his agent is weakened because the seller
pays the broker's compensation. Although one can act as an agent gratuitously,41
most brokers sell real estate to earn a living. Work done in the normal transaction is expected to lead to a commission. It seems reasonable, therefore, to
expect the broker to give his allegiance to the party who is paying him. While
the listing agreement legally obligates the seller to pay the commission42 the
37. E.g., Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Lingsch v. Savage, 213
Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963); Sawyer v. Tildahl, 275 Minn. 457, 148 N.W.2d 131

(1967).
38. E.g., Carrel v. Lux, 101 Ariz. 430, 420 P.2d 564 (1966) (misrepresentation of acreage
and income from property); Siler v. Gunn, 117 Ga. App. 325, 160 S.E.2d 427 (1968) (misrepresentation of seller's minimum price); Gilbey v. Cooper, 37 Ohio Misc. 119, 310 N.E.2d 268

(1973) (willful misrepresentation by failure to disclose easements). See Note, supra note 18, at
780.84.
39. The listing agreement does not come under the statute of frauds because it provides
for the broker's services in connection with the sale of land, not for the actual transfer of any
interest in property. E.g., Jefcoat v. Singer Hous. Co., 619 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 1980). Some
states nonetheless insist that brokerage contracts be in writing. E.g., IDAnO CODE §9-508 (1979).
40. Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. 2d 50, 65, 172 P.2d 533, 541 (1946) (no recovery
for secret profits unless facts show broker represented seller as agent); Swift v. White, 256
Iowa 1013, 1020, 129 N.W.2d 748, 752 (1964) (sufficient evidence to give jury the question
regarding broker acting as buyer's agent for limited purposes); PMH Properties v. Nichols,
263 N.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Minn. 1978) (question for jury whether broker was acting for buyer
as well as seller).
41.

REsrATEmENT (SEcoND) oF AGENCY §378 (1957).

42. See note 19 supra. Land sale contracts may recognize the broker's entitlement to a
commission, but do not contain a promise by the buyer to pay it. See paragraph 19 of contract,
reprinted in, C. HAAR & L. LMBMAs, supra note 16, at 501.
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home buyer may be paying all or part of the commission indirectly. Sellers
often increase the price if they employ a broker so that the sale's net proceeds
equal what might have been obtained by selling privately. 43 The buyer thus
effectively pays the commission, despite the fact that liability for the commission rests on the seller. In practice, the broker collects his commission at closing
from money provided by the buyer. 44 If a transaction does not close, the buyer
may pay some compensation to the broker as an element of the seller's damages
in an action on the purchase and sale agreement. 4 If the superiority of the
broker-seller relationship is based on the broker's compensation flowing from
the seller, it is therefore undermined to the extent that the commission is
buried in the sales price.
Although custom dictates that the seller pays the commission, the mere fact
that the seller agrees to make this payment is not sufficient to create an agency
relationship between seller and broker. Sometimes facts and circumstances
demonstrate the broker was really acting for the buyer in the transaction.46
When such a case arises, the seller's agreement does nothing more than deter4
mine how the broker is to be compensated for his efforts. 7
Nothing theoretically prohibits a buyer from hiring a broker, agreeing to
pay a fee for services, and thus creating a principal-agent relationship. In
practice, however, this seldom occurs. The organization and operation of the
residential brokerage business discourages such arrangements. Home buyers
understand that brokers will receive compensation from sellers, and they know
that brokers will work with them without additional charge. Formal contracts
are not solicited by buyers and brokers do not insist on them. The broker ends
up a seller's agent in law, and an extension of the seller in the transaction.
Despite the hours spent together and closeness of their relationship, buyer and
broker become, at least in theory, adversaries in the negotiation process.
One argument remains for a buyer who feels mistreated by a broker who is
the seller's agent and whose conduct does not amount to fraud. A buyer can
assert the breach of certain duties brokers owe even to non-principal parties in
a real estate transaction. The foundation of these duties is somewhat obscure.
One source is the National Association of Realtors' Code of Ethics. 4s Under it
43. See note 106 and accompanying text infra.
44. See Gresham, supra note 8, at 437 & n.55.
45. Seller can recover incidental damages flowing from the buyer's breach of the land sale
contract, including any commissions for which the seller becomes liable. See UNIFORm LAND
TRANSACTION ACT 2-507(a). Land sale contracts typically let the seller keep as liquidated
damages any deposit the buyer has made in lieu of, or as part of, an action for damages
against a breaching buyer. A Maryland court recently held that the seller must elect between
forfeiture of the deposit or an action for damages. Blood v. Gibbons, 288 Md. 268, 418 A.2d
213 (Md. 1980). If the seller keeps the deposit and does not seek damages, the broker usually
accepts one-half the deposit (up to the amount of the commission) as compensation for
services. See, e.g., paragraphs 19 and 22 of contract, reprinted in, C. HAAR & L. LIEBMAN,
supra note 16, at 501-02.
46. See, e.g., Banner v. Elm, 251 Md. 694, 248 A.2d 452 (1968).
47. See, e.g., Wright v. Dutch, 140 Cal. App. 2d 891, 897-98, 296 P.2d 34, 37-38 (1956);
Sands v. Eagle Oil & Ref. Co., 83 Cal. App. 2d 312, 318, 188 P.2d 782, 785 (1948); Duffy v.
Setchell, 38 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149, 347 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1976).
48. See generally CODE OF ETHIcs, supra note 23.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol33/iss5/1

10

Currier: Finding the Broker's Place in the Typical Residential Real Estate
1981]

BROKER'S PLACE IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION

member brokers must deal honestly and in good faith with all non-principals,
including buyers. 49 Another source is the notion that the broker's license is a
privilege conferred by the state in exchange for which the broker must act in
the public interest. Dealing honestly and fairly with all members of the public
is part of the broker's duty of furthering the public interest.5 0
The idea that the broker must deal straightforwardly with the public adds
dimension to the simple picture that emerges from strict application of agency
law to the relationships among the parties in residential real estate transactions.
That the brokers' professional organization has a code of conduct recognizing
the needs of buyers implies that brokers believe they serve both parties to a
real estate transaction and that agency law inaccurately reflects their dual role
in the market place.
*While the broker will thus usually be regarded as the seller's agent, the
buyer's claim on the broker's loyalty cannot be discounted entirely. Considerable uncertainty is created for the broker in the typical residential real
estate transaction. The problem is exacerbated by buyers who believe, for legitimate reasons, that they receive meaningful assistance from the broker. The
following hypotheticals illustrate the tensions that arise because the brokerseller relationship is ill-defined.
Hypothetical #1: Seller's house has been on the market for a month at
$80,000. The buyer's budget and income indicate that the most that he can
offer is $78,000. Buyer would like to get it for less and wants guidance about an
appropriatelylow opening bid. Seller is willing to take as little as $76,000 for
the house and is anxious to sell because the equity is needed to make the down
payment on a new home.
The buyer and seller can reach an agreement in this situation because the
seller's low price and the buyer's high price overlap by $2,000; but within that
range where will the price be fixed? The broker has a fiduciary responsibility
as the seller's agent to push the contract price as close to $78,000 as possible.
The obligation, to obtain the highest price for the seller-principal has been
described as an overriding one.51 To hint that the seller might accept less or
that the seller is anxious to sell probably breaches the duty of good faith and
loyalty the broker owes the seller. s2 A strict legal perspective would indicate
that the broker should refuse to assist a buyer in determining a reasonable
s
opening bid.5
49. Under article 7 a realtor must treat fairly all parties to a transaction even though the
primary responsibility is to the principal. Id. at 41.
50.
Fla. 96,
51.
52.

Amato v. Latter 9- Blum, Inc., 227 La. 537, 79 So. 2d 873 (1955); Zilchin v. Dill, 157
25 So. 2d 4 (1946). See Comment, supra note 30, at 1346-48.
Marmis v. Solot Co., 117 Ariz. 499, 503, 573 P.2d 899, 903 (1977).
The classic case is Haymes v. Rogers, 70 Ariz. 257, 219 P.2d 339, rev'd on rehearing,70

Ariz. 408, 222 P.2d 789 (1950) (broker hinted that property listed at $9,500 might be acquired
for $8,500).
53. Another view holds that because property frequently sells for less than the list price,
if a broker's assistance to a buyer in formulating a first bid is for the purpose of maintaining
that person's interest in the property, the broker does not breach any duty toward his seller-
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If the buyer makes an initial offer of $75,000, the broker must then determine what advice, if any, to give the seller. Should broker advise the seller to
reject the $75,000 contract or reveal that the buyer will pay $78,000? Disclosure
of facts that may be material to the principal's decision on a matter within the
scope of the agency is one of the agent's fiduciary responsibilities.5- How much
a buyer will pay clearly is a material fact. One case held that a broker violated
his duty to the seller by agreeing to take two offers from a buyer, submit the
lower one and make the higher offer only if the lower one was rejected. 55 The
decision recognized that withholding knowledge of the buyer's willingness to
increase his contract price was a breach of the broker's fiduciary duty.
Further evidence of problems arising from the proposition that the broker
should advise the seller to hold out for the buyer's maximum bid can be found
in "secret profit" cases. Courts have awarded damages to a seller when a broker
secretly purchased at a price within a seller's previously expressed range and
conveyed at a higher price, generating a secret profit for the broker. 56 Similarly,
although the broker does not profit if he does nothing more than keep silent
about a buyer's maximum bid, a business opportunity for the seller is squandered. The seller suffers the same harm as if the broker had engaged in selfdealing and secretly profited.
Despite the broker's clear duty to the seller, the buyer has credible arguments that the broker should refrain from reporting his maximum price to the
seller. Depending on what questions the buyer asks, the broker must also consider whether to tell the buyer about seller's willingness to accept less than the
asking price. Revealing the seller's lowest price to the buyer directly conflicts
with the duty to obtain the highest possible price for the seller-principal. There
is no support for the notion that the broker's duty to deal fairly and honestly
with the public or a specific non-principal party includes the obligation to disclose such data.
Brokers have, however, been found in breach of the duty to deal fairly
where their own interests, rather than a seller's, are at stake. For instance, in
Zilchin v. Dill57 an often cited Florida case, a non-principal buyer was permitted to recover against a broker who had represented that property could
not be acquired for less than $5,500 when in fact the broker bought it for
$4,500 and resold it to buyer for a quick $1,000 profit. Rather than finding the
broker behaved improperly by self-dealing in the transaction, the court emphasized the broker's public responsibility. According to the court, in exprincipal. Haymes v. Rogers, 70 Ariz. 257, 262-64, 219 P.2d 339, 342-44 (1950) (Udall, J.,
dissenting).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §381 (1957). E.g., MacGregor v. Florida Real
Estate Comm'n, 99 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1958) (broker should disclose identity of buyer); Reese v.
Harper, 8 Utah 2d 119, 329 P.2d 410 (1958) (broker should fully explain terms of offer);
Monty v. Peterson, 85 Wash. 2d 956. 540 P.2d 1377 (1975) (broker should disclose significance
of covenants).

55. Mason v. Bulleri, 25 Ariz. App. 357, 543 P.2d 478 (1976).
56. E.g., Jay v. General Realties Co., 49 A.2d 752 (D.C. 1946); Iriart v. Johnson, 75 N.M.
745, 749-50, 411 P.2d 226, 228-29 (1966). Cf. St. James Armenian Church of Los Angeles v.
Kurkjian, 47 Cal. App. 3d 547, 121 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1975).
57. 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4 (1946).
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change for "a monopoly to engage in a lucrative business," the broker must
conduct himself honestly and ethically in all business activities. The court,
moreover, said persons dealing with a broker may rely on the broker's adherance to this standard of conduct. 59 Despite the old rule of caveat emptor
and the lack of a formal relationship between the parties, a buyer could prevail
because the broker breached the duty to deal honestly and ethically with all
customers.
In theory, Zilchin imposes a general requirement on brokers to answer truthfully specific questions about the acceptability of a certain offer. Zilchin should,
however, be taken as an instance of self-dealing and its application should be
confined to similar cases. The case ought not be read to compel a broker to
volunteer information about the seller's best price. To suggest that a broker
behaves unethically if he does not advise a buyer that his proposed offer is significantly more than necessary considerably undercuts the fiduciary duty of the
broker to the seller. Courts are unlikely to find that Zilchin imposes a duty on
the broker to reveal information about a seller's willingness to accept a lower
selling price to an unquestioning buyer.
Buyers might not expect the broker to reveal the seller's lowest price, but
most buyers want the house at the lowest possible price and will solicit the
broker's help in achieving this goal by asking general questions. The broker's
conflict is obvious. Public responsibilities call on him to aid the buyer and the
buyer expects his help. On the other hand, the broker's fiduciary duties to the
seller as principal dearly demand that the broker work to obtain the highest
possible price from the buyer. The pull from the seller's side is probably
stronger and is certainly more firmly grounded in the law of agency.60 The
broker is consequently not likely to reveal the seller's lowest acceptable price.
Although the broker may not reveal anything to the buyer regarding the
seller's attitude' about price, the honest and ethical broker may conclude that
disclosing the buyer's highest price would not be appropriate either. This decision should not be based on a belief that the broker's duties to the seller do
not require such a disclosure. 61 Fulfilling the agent's duty to obtain the highest
price requires the broker to release to the seller all helpful information relevant
to the negotiations between seller and buyer. The buyer has only revealed his
highest offer to the broker because of the intimacy which developed during the
time spent looking at various houses, and the buyer's perception that the broker
is working for him. Given the context in which the broker obtained the information, it seems unethical and unfair for the broker to use this information
against the buyer's interests by disclosing it to the seller.
The proposition that the broker can refrain from revealing the buyer's
highest price to the seller is also supported by case law. From the facts of many
cases it can be reasonably inferred that the broker knew much more about the
buyer's top rice than he revealed to the seller. For instance, in the classic case

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 98,25 So. 2d at 4.
Id. at 98,25 So. 2d at 5.
See notes 51 &52 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 53 &54 and accompanying text supra.
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of Haymes v. Rogers62 the dissenting judge concluded from testimony the
broker's statements about the seller's willingness to accept less than the list price
63
were made in order to keep the buyer interested in the property. Little good
could come from maintaining the buyer's interest unless the broker knew or
at least firmly believed, the buyer might later be convinced to increase his bid
for the house. Yet the courts do not discuss the broker's failure to disclose his
knowledge or belief about the buyer's best price.
Brokers who think carefully about such situations undoubtedly feel the
proper course of action is not clearly charted for them. The safest course of
conduct would be to reveal nothing specific to either party about the other
party's price guidelines. This solution, however, denies both parties the advice
each expects from the broker.
Hypothetical #2: Buyer plans to make an offer on a house in a neighborhood where most of the houses are twelve to fifteen years old. Broker knows of
several houses in the area that have had structuralproblems due to either faulty
construction or improper compaction of the soil prior to the laying of the
foundation. A visual inspection of the particular house involved discloses no
cracks, separationsor other indications that buyer may have a problem in the
future. The house is only four years old, however, much newer than the other
houses in the area.
This hypothetical concerns whether the broker has an obligation to refrain
from disclosing a potential defect in the house. A seller is liable for concealment, misstatements, or failure to disclose material facts regarding property to
be purchased. 64 Courts, however, have been reluctant to hold sellers liable on
implied warranty or strict liability theories for defects in the fitness or quality
of used homes.6 5 As a result, buyers must satisfy themselves that the house is
sound prior to accepting a deed.i6 The buyer may ask the seller questions to
62. 70 Ariz. 257, 219 P.2d 339 (1950).
63. Id. at 263-64, 219 P.2d at 343 (Udall, J., dissenting).
64. E.g., Wilhite v. Mays, 140 Ga. App. 816, 232 S.E.2d 141 (1976), afJ'd, 239 Ga. 31, 235
S.E.2d 532 (1977) (nondisclosure by seller of sewage disposal problem held fraudulent);
Hunter v. Wilson, 355 So. 2d 39 (La. App. 1978) (nondisclosure of leaking roof justifies claim
for reduction in purchase price). S.ee generally, A AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, supra
note 19, at 477-85.
65. E.g., Graham v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Coburn v. Lenox
Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 378 A.2d 599 (1977).
66. A buyer can provide for inspection and condition the obligation to purchase on the
house being in good condition in the land sale contract. Standard form contracts, however,
do not often contain inspection clauses. Gresham, supra note 8, at 431-32. One recent study
found that fewer than five percent of all used houses sold in 1977 were professionally inspected at the time of sale. U.S.

DEPT. oF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV.,

I A STUDY OF HOME

14 (1977). Reliance on a contractual provision regarding
a house's condition after a deed has been given is risky because of the merger doctrine which
holds that promises in the contract not contained in the deed do not survive the closing. The
merger doctrine is replete with exceptions, however, and a homeseeker may be able to obtain
relief for some defects after acceptance of a deed. See Dunham, Merger by Deed - Was It
Ever Automatic, 10 GA. L. Ray. 419 (1976).
INSPECTiON AND WARRANTY PROGRAMS
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discover known problems, or inspect the house between the signing of the contract for sale and the closing. Alternatively, the buyer may rely on the broker to
point out any potential problems with the house.
As seller's agent, the broker is subject to the same standard of conduct and
rules regarding disclosure of information that govern the seller.6 7 If the seller
must answer questions truthfully, so must the broker. If the seller must come
forward with information unlikely to be discovered by the buyer, so must the
broker. Similarly, if the situation allows the seller's silence, the broker may also
remain silent. Indeed, as seller's agent, a broker should be quiet unless other-wise instructed by his principal, the seller.
In the second hypothetical, there are no apparent problems with the house,
and, let us assume, the seller has told the broker that no defects have manifested themselves. Raising doubts about the house's quality may deter the
buyer from offering to buy the house or cause him to discount the price because
of the possible problems. Advising the buyer to proceed with caution based on
suspicion alone and without a duty to disclose seems inconsistent with the
proposition that the broker should secure the most favorable contract for his
principal.
The broker may be under some obligation to the buyer, however, to investigate the structural condition of the house or disclose the other problems in
the neighborhood under article 9 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the National
Association of Realtors. This provision states: "The Realtor shall avoid exaggeration, misrepresentation, or concealment of pertinent facts. He has an
affirmative obligation to discover adverse factors that a reasonably competent
and diligent investigation would disclose." 68 Several of the interpretive memoranda under this article are relevant in analyzing the hypothetical. For instance, a broker was found to be in violation of article 9 for taking a seller's
word and failing to independently ascertain whether the floors in a house were
hardwood.69 The buyer viewed the home, advertised as having hardwood floors,
while the floors were partially covered by rugs on which the seller's furniture
still sat. On taking possession, the buyer discovered that the floors were hardwood only around the edges. The seller claimed that the rugs had been down
for so long that he had forgotten the harwood floors had been eliminated
during construction. The seller also attempted to minimize the defect by suggesting that the buyer would probably also use carpets. The broker was found
to be liable to the buyer for accepting the seller's word without verifying the
information, especially since the hardwood floors had been a feature important
enough to include in advertising. The existence of hardwood floors were termed
a "pertinent fact" that the broker should have verified.
Although the example differs from the hypothetical in that the broker made
67. Snelson v. Ondulando Highlands Corp., 5 Cal. App. 3d 243, 251-52, 84 Cal. Rptr. 800,
803-05 (1970) (misrepresentation that land was not filled); McGerr v. Beals, 180 Neb. 767, 145
N.W.2d 579 (1966) (misrepresentation that basement would remain dry). Cf. Payne, Broker's
Liability for Nondisclosure of Known Defects in Sale Property- Caveat Emptor Still Applies,
6 REAL EST.L. J. 341 (1978).
68. CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 23, at 65.
69. Id. at 72-73.
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a representation rather than merely remaining silent, it illustrates the broker's
duty to verify statements made by the sellers and not take them at face value.
In our situation, since the broker is aware of a potential problem, professional
standards may require him to do more than examine the house in a cursory
manner for obvious cracks.
Another illustration under article 9 is even more to the point.70 In it, the
buyer purchased a home served by septic tank rather than sewer. Prior to purchase, the buyer had independently determined that the street on which the
house was located was served by a sewer. The broker was unaware the house
was not connected to the sewer, but had never represented the house as being
connected. In fact, every other house for several blocks in either direction was
connected to a sewer. The broker was found to have violated article 9 by failing
to ascertain and reveal that the house was served by a septic tank. The absence
of a sewer connection in an area where most homes are connected to a sewer is
a pertinent fact which the broker should have discovered. The fact that no
representations were made about the matter was not material. The structural
condition of the house in our hypothetical is as sigrnificant as the absence of a
sewer in this article 9 illustration. In both cases the broker was silent on the
particular topic and without knowledge of the problem.
The hypothetical and these illustrations under article 9 differ because in
both illustrations there was in fact a defect that the buyer needed to know
about, while in our hypothetical there may be nothing wrong with the structural condition of the house. This distinction, however, is immaterial. Consistent with the view suggested here about the broker-buyer relationship, article
9 suggests that the broker ought to find out whether an accurate picture of the
house is being conveyed. When the broker pulls up the rug to check whether
the floors are hardwood as the seller has said, the floors may indeed be hardwood. If the broker similarly checks the house for structural problems and
there are none, no problem exists and nothing needs to be said. The Code of
Ethics intends to force brokers to satisfy themselves that information of importance to the ordinary home buyer is not concealed. This approach compels
the broker to scrutinize the house or advise the buyer of the potential repair
problem based on the condition of other homes in the area.
Courts, however, have seldom held a broker responsible to a buyer for not
discovering and disclosing pertinent information about a house.71 Their reluctance to find liability in such situations is a reflection of basic agency law
principles that require the agent to reveal only the information the principal
would have to disclose. The broker's public responsibilities7 2 as well as the
buyers' expectations that brokers are looking out for their interests- , should
nevertheless lead to decisions such as those suggested by the NAR's Code of
Ethics.
There is, however, an occasional departure from the standard path. In
70. Id. at 74.
71. See, e.g., Cashion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268, 270-71 (1977) (broker representing seller
need not tell buyers about water problem in basement).

72. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 3-17 and accompanying text supra.
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Spargnapaniv. Wright,74 a District of Columbia trial court found a broker
liable to a purchaser who had bought a house with a totally useless heating
system. Based on the seller's statements, the broker told the buyers that the
house could be heated for "a little more than $100 a year." 75 In fact, the heater
was broken and had been patched and painted over by the seller to look new.
The court held that even if the broker did not know the heater was defective
he could still be liable for fraud. The court attempted to base its holding on
the broker's statement that the house could be heated for less than $100 a year
when, in fact, it could not be heated at all. The court had to strain, however, to
characterize the broker's statement as a representation that could support a
fraud claim. The court seemed to be moving toward the concept embodied in
article 9 of the Code of Ethics TM requiring the broker to verify material facts
about the house independently and advise the buyer of any discovered defects.
Establishing that the broker violated his professional responsibilities by
failing to investigate the structural condition of the house and to report potential problems may be little comfort to the buyer saddled with a defective
house. The buyer faces an arduous task in attempting to recover damages from
the broker who fails to inspect vigorously. The broker's legal exposure to liability from any source is minimal if he remains passive and silent.77 Just as in the
first hypothetical, the buyer is not getting the service he may reasonably believe the broker is providing.
Hypothetical #3: Buyer has two school-aged children. The house that interests buyer is located in an area which has repeatedly been shifted from one
school district to anotherin recent years. Buyer has expressed a desire to live in
a quiet, family-oriented neighborhood. This house is in such an area; however,
there are long-rangeplans to widen a nearby road from two to six lanes. Also, a
number of smaller homes within a few blocks of the house have been purchased
recently by investors and are occupied by renters, including groups of students
at'tendinga local college.

This final problem calls on the broker to judge whether or not his agency
responsibilities to the seller demand silence about the frequent change in school
districts, planned road widening and nearby rental home encroachment. This
hypothetical, in contrast to the second one, focuses on aspects of housing not
easily dealt with by testing, inspection and the like. The broker's proper response depends on how specifically the buyer probes for information. Buyers
use brokers' services to facilitate gathering data they need in making purchase
decisions. Buyers unfamiliar with a community may express hopes about a
living environment but lack enough information to ask specific questions. In
such a situation the broker's position is a difficult one. In deciding whether to
leave the buyer on his own to gather the necessary information, the broker must
74. 110 A.2d 82 (Mun. Ct. App. C.D. 1954).
75. Id. at 83.

76. See text accompanying note 68 supra.

77. The broker must answer a question honestly and fully if his seller-principal woul.
be obligated to so answer. See note Q7 a i~c accompanying text supr4,
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consider the possibility that the school situation has stabilized, the road will
never be widened because of neighborhood opposition, and the transition of
the neighborhood into rental property will cease. In the face of the strong
fiduciary duty the broker owes the seller, the uncertainty of the situation would
likely lead the broker to conclude that silence is the proper course of action
unless a specific question is asked.
This hypothetical focuses attention on how brokers handle buyers' questions
about the quality of life a house offers. The broker's silence in this context
would be disappointing to many buyers. While admittedly amorphous, the
environment of a neighborhood is very important to most buyers. The broker's
familiarity with the community makes him the natural source of information
and advice. An informed buyer may willingly assume the risk of widening, the
encroachment of rental housing and instability in school districting. These
would be only a few of the many factors to be weighed and sifted in making a
purchase decision. The critical question is whether the broker should aid the
buyer in compiling all the relevant facts rather than leaving him to guess
whether all the necessary questions have been asked and all the risks identified.
Neither the legal system nor the Code of Ethics offers much support to a
buyer who relies on a real estate broker for guidance with respect to the present
character of a neighborhood or its likely future. In one disciplinary proceeding
under article 7 of the Code of Ethics, 7s a broker who disclosed to a buyer, under
contract to purchase a house, that a nearby bus stop was being moved to a location some six blocks from the house was exonerated.7 The home's proximity
to public transportation had been featured in advertisements, and the buyer,
because of a physical disability, found the house desirable because of the bus
stop in the front yard. The seller contended that because the new stop was only
six blocks away the substance of the advertisement could still be supported.
The seller argued the broker breached his fiduciary duty by revealing the
change to the buyer who thereafter refused to complete the purchase.
Under the circumstances, however, the broker was found to have acted ethically.
The broker's duty to deal fairly required disclosure of this material fact to this
buyer and overrode the duty of loyalty to his principal's interests.
This Code of Ethics illustration only marginally supports the hypothetical
buyer's assertion that the broker must inform him of prospects for change in the
neighborhood. The Code's example involves an actual change rather than the
mere prospect of change. The difference between reporting an actual change
and offering an opinion about the prospects for change may distinguish the
cases, even though the hypothetical broker's opinion would have some basis in
fact. The broker may also have a greater obligation to disclose to someone who
entered a contract in reasonable reliance on the broker's representation than
he does to someone still able to conduct an independent investigation and protect himself against uncertainties in the land sale contract. In the illustration,
78. Article 7 states: "In accepting employment as an agent, the Realtor pledges himself
to protect and promote the interest of the client. This obligation of absolute fidelity to the
client's interest is primary, but it does not relieve the Realtor of his obligation to treat fairly
all parties to the transaction." CODE oF ETHIcS, supra note 23, at 41.
79. Id. at 42-43.
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the buyer had ascertained that a bus stop was located quite near the house as
the advertisement had stated. Although the buyer might have checked with the
transit company to see if it planned to move the route or required the protection of a condition in the contract, the buyer's assumption that the bus stop
would not be moved was not unreasonable. The seller might reject an offer
conditioned on the presence of a bus stop within a certain distance from the
house because the location of bus stops is not within the seller's control. In
light of all the circumstances, fair treatment of the buyer allowed the broker
to tell the buyer of the change. Of course, the broker's exoneration does not
affect the buyer's liability for breach of the land sale contract.8 0 The illustration mentions that the broker "insisted" the seller refund the buyer's deposit.8'
This may not be required, however, if the contract was not conditioned on the
bus stop's existence and contains an integration clause.
The buyer in this hypothetical need not make an offer on the house until
satisfied that it meets his need for a quiet, family-oriented neighborhood. The
road widening is contained in plans available to the buyer at some local government office. The instability of school districting could be discovered through
conversation with school officials. The influx of renters may be harder to uncover, but modest effort should bring it to the buyer's attention. The reliance
on facts supplied by the broker distinguishes the bus stop illustration from the
third hypothetical. A broker would probably not be exonerated for advising
buyers about neighborhood conditions like those in the hypothetical, even
though the Code of Ethics directs brokers to deal fairly with all parties to a
real estate transaction.
Case law helps our third buyer even less than the Code of Ethics does. The
agent's duties of loyalty and good faith8 2 restrain the broker from delivering
the advice and counsel the buyer wants. The seller need not volunteer this type
of information to a prospective purchaser. The seller, of course, could do so
and could direct the broker to do so. Absent such authorization, however, the
broker's duty to obtain the highest possible price for the seller deters him from
offering general advice because the prospective buyer might lose interest in the
house or reduce the offering price. The broker's safest course of action again is
silence, and once more the buyer's expectation of guidance is frustrated.
RESOLVING T=E DISPARITY BETwEEN
THEORY AND PRACTICE

The hypothetical cases in the preceding section support the assumption
that the parties to a residential real estate transaction are not likely to get the
aid they want and, in fact, believe they are receiving from the real estate broker.
A buyer might suffer by relying on a broker who remains silent in an effort to
80. There is probably nothing in the contract that would permit the buyer to cancel due
to the change in location of the bus stop. The seller would probably not have expressly warranted such a fact. Although material to the buyer, the shifting of the bus stop was not so
material that the contract could be rescinded on the basis of mistake or breach of implied
warranty.

81. CoDE oF ETmCs, supra note 23, at 43.
82. See Note, supra note 18, at 776-77.
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comply strictly with the principles of agency law. A seller who expects passivity
may be hurt by a broker who frankly discusses options with a homeseeker,
pursuant to the call by the Code of Ethics to deal honestly and fairly with all
persons. The broker attempting to fulfill his duties to both buyers and sellers
confronts a seemingly unresolvable dilemma. The obligation to hold the interest of his principal above all others conflicts with his public responsibility
to deal fairly with nonprincipals in real estate transactions. Although most
transactions are concluded without complaint from either party, the thoughtful
broker should realize that only the rare conveyance does not involve at least a
technical violation of law or regulation.
Given the reasonable expectations both sellers and buyers harbor concerning the broker's loyalty, alternative ways of handling the legal relationships
among the parties must be evaluated. Legal theory must be brought closer to
the operation of the residential real estate market. Perhaps the tangled web of
conflicting rights and duties could be clarified by only slight changes in the
law. The viability of any alteration must be assessed in the context of the
present structure of the real estate market. An examination of the advantages
and problems with a number of possible reforms is necessary.
DualAgency
Recognizing a principal-agent relationship between broker and buyer along
with the broker's traditional duties to the seller would provide legal support
for the buyer's expectations regarding the broker's role as an advisor and give
the broker a solid foundation upon which to engage in counseling activity. The
duality of fiduciary responsibilities to parties who are often adversaries, however, conflicts with the agent's duty to serve the principal's interests above all
others. The inherent shortcomings of dual agency considerably undercut its
usefulness in coping with the problems considered here.
For dual agency to be helpful to home buyers, the broker-buyer agency relationship should come into existence early in the home selection process.
Buyers who want guidance about neighborhoods, prices and the quality of
homes could logically receive it from brokers during the search process. If the
broker withholds counsel and advice throughout the search period because of
his uncertainty concerning the agency relationship between himself and the
buyer, little purpose is served by the concept of dual agency. Dual agency will
become an issue only in after-the-fact disputes where harm has already been
suffered by the buyer. The objective is to find a legal construct for the broker's
role that reflects the legitimate expectations of the parties involved. Dual
agency is thus a helpful solution only if the broker becomes a dual agent at the
outset of the broker-homeseeker relationship.
Before the broker can act as a dual agent, the knowledge and consent of
both principals must be obtained. 3 Achieving such consent in the current
market structure might be difficult. No agreement is executed in the typical
83. See, e.g., Warren v. Magels Realty, 23 Ariz. App. 318, 321, 533 P.2d 78, 81 (1975);
Duffy v. Setchell, 38 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149-50, 347 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1976); Brandt v. Koepnick,
2 Wash. App. 671, 674, 469 P.2d 189, 190-91 (1970).
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residential transaction whereby the broker undertakes to locate the buyer a
suitable house.8 4 The broker-buyer agency relationship may not require a
written document, especially since compensation will be arranged between
seller and broker.
There appears no obvious point at which to establish the agency relationship between buyer and broker. Perhaps the sharing of a certain quantity or
quality of information could be the test. The buyer would have to show some
event or reason for believing the broker acted on his behalf and that the broker
undertook to do so.es The buyer must, however, have the broker's loyalty
from the beginning, in order to openly discuss the characteristics of the house
he wants in order to make the search process efficient.
The broker also needs a clear demarcation of the agency relationship's
commencement to permit him to decide what duties are owed to the buyer.
Consider, for instance, under what circumstances the broker should express his
concern about the structural condition of the house in our second hypothetical.
The buyer's need to know is not determined by whether it is the first or twentyfirst house shown him by the broker. The broker, on the other hand, has a duty
to state his concern to a buyer who is his principal, but arguably should remain
silent if the relationship has not evolved to the point of agency. If the buyer
shows continuing interest in the house and broker subsequently reveals his
concern after enough has happened to create the agency, the buyer may wonder
why the broker failed to communicate his concern earlier. The buyer may also
become suspicious that the broker has withheld other information. This lack
of trust and confidence destroys the very quality the agency concept should
bring to the broker-buyer relationship.
Obtaining the seller's consent to a dual agency arrangement is another
problem 8 8 Optimally, a seller would consent to his broker acting as dual agent
with respect to all buyers working with the broker so that separate consent
would not need to be obtained for each client. If the agency relationship with
the buyer commences at or near the outset of the broker's contact with each
prospect, the seller's consent to the dual agency should be contained in the
listing agreement.87 A seller who understands the implications of buyer-broker
agency might be deterred from fully explaining his hopes and expectation%
about the sale to the broker. This would interfere with the broker's satisfactory
servicing of seller's needs. Sellers might, therefore, resist dual agency.
Absent these procedural problems, the dual agency model seems attractive.
Once the broker becomes a dual agent he would owe the full range of fiduciary

.:

84. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
85. The finding of an agency relationship between the buyer and broker is a question of
fact. For a discussion of facts of significance see Cashion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268 (Ala. 1977).
This case is discussed in Payne, supra note 67.
86. The dual agency does not become effective, thereby affording protection to the brol-p
and benefit to the buyer, until the consent of both parties is given. Mallory v. Watt. ]00
Idaho 119, 122, 594 P.2d 629, 632 (1979); Shepley v. Green, 243 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Mo. App.
1951).
87. A simple clause acknowledging and accepting the broker's undertaking to act for
potential buyers could easily be inserted in the listing agreement and should be sufficient
i.consent to the broker acting as a dual agent.
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duties to both parties.88 This concept may be only superficially appealing, however. The shortcomings of dual agency are illustrated by returning to the first
hypothetical. The agent has the duty to disclose all known facts that would be
material to the principal's decision. As a dual agent, the broker must consider
whether he must reveal the buyer's highest price to the seller and the seller's
lowest price to the buyer. Comments to the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY state that
the dual agent does not violate a duty to one principal by fully disclosing all
relevant facts to the other; however, when confidential information, such as
statement about price, is given to the agent by the principal, the agent's duty
compels his silence1 9
Dual agency may help the buyer in hypotheticals two and three because the
broker's advice does not derive from conversations with the seller. On the
important matter of price, however, the agent cannot assist the buyer. The
seller also loses the benefit of the broker's counsel on price. Quite clearly the
broker should not reveal buyer's high price, or recommend the buyer's offer
be rejected after entering into a principal-agent relationship with the buyer
and receiving information concerning his maximum offering price. Limiting
the duality of the agency to non-confidential matters makes both agencies incomplete. This may improve the buyer's situation, because he would not otherwise be entitled to the broker's advice; but, approaches should be explored that
give the buyer all the services he expects and needs from the broker.
Another approach, related to dual agency, would permit a broker to represent the buyer's interests if another broker listed the housef 0 Throughout
this article the assumption has been that only one broker works on a sale, dealing with both buyer and seller. In the context of multiple listing services, however, the most suitable homes are likely to have been listed by someone other
than the broker working with the buyer. In such a situation, a natural division
of labor may result, serving the legitimate needs of each party - the listing
broker can act as seller's agent, and the broker, who has established a relationship with the buyer and who shows him the house (the selling broker) can act
as the buyer's agent. The parties may be comfortable with this arrangement,
but it does not square with the legal framework which applies to the typical
transaction. Legally the selling broker is the seller's agent because of the
multiple listing agreement signed by member brokers which provides for
splitting the commission between the brokers who participate in a conveyance. 91
Courts have not been reluctant to hold the selling broker responsible to the

88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §392 (1957); Galyen v. Voyager Inn, Inc., 328
F. Supp. 1299, 1302-03 (W.D. Okla. 1971); Martin v. Hiekin, 340 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. App.
1960).
89. Comment (b) to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §392 (1957) states: "The agent
...
is under no duty to disclose, and has a duty not to disclose to one principal, confidential
information given to him by the other, such as the price he is willing to pay. If the information is of such a nature that he cannot fairly give advice to one without disclosing it, he
cannot properly continue to act as adviser." (emphasis added).
90. See Comment, supra note 0, at 1353.
91. Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wash. 2d 520, 527-29, 429 P.2d 864, 868-69 (1967). See notes
25-26 and accompanying text supra.
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seller, even though the two have no express agreement.9 2 To work for the buyer
under the current legal framework, therefore the selling broker would have to
become a dual agent. In such a role, the selling broker confronts the same problems that exist in a one-broker dual agency situation.
Perhaps the rule that makes the selling broker the agent of the seller
through the multiple listing agreement bears reconsideration. Sellers may desire
the added exposure their house receives through multiple listing, but they may
not expect any broker other than their own to work vigorously to obtain the
most favorable deal for them. If so, they suffer no harm if the sub-agency of the
selling broker is eliminated. The selling broker-buyer relationship would have
to be established by facts other than a written agreement in most cases, but this
is not an insurmountable hurdle.
Like the one-broker dual agency situation, however, this approach falls
short. It fails to protect those buyers interested in houses listed by their own
brokers. It creates, moreover, new gray areas that place the broker in conflict of
interest situations where he will almost unavoidably breach a duty owed to
someone. For example, in our third hypothetical, the buyer may have narrowed
his choice to two houses - the one described in the example and another, more
expensive home in a more suburban area. The latter home is free from the concerns the buyer might have about the neighborhood's quietness and stability.
If the broker listed the first house but not the second one, helping the buyer
compare the two becomes a problem. If, as the buyer's agent, the broker points
out the risks of the first house and favors the suburban one, he has violated the
duty of loyalty owed to the owner of the first house. If as the seller's broker he
remains silent about these risks, the buyer, unaware of the potential problems,
may choose the first home because it is equivalent in his mind to the suburban
one, but cheaper. If the road is later widened or the school districts changed,
the buyer will be greatly distressed and may argue that the broker improperly
advised him during the home selection process. Either course of action could
leave the broker liable for a claim of unprofessional conduct.
Dual agency may shelter brokers from actions by sellers who allege too much
assistance was given to buyers resulting in lower prices for sellers' homes. The
concept gives some legal recognition to the directive of the Code of Ethics requiring brokers to deal honestly and fairly with all persons; however, dual
agency, in any of the forms considered here, is not a panacea.
Disclosure
The confusion about the broker's role in the conveyancing process can be
viewed as a consumer protection problem. Attention has been focused recently
on the frequent abuses consumers suffer in the property conveyancing process.
These abuses relate primarily to expenses for obtaining financing and transferring title. 93 Mandatory disclosure has become a significant consumer protec92. See, e.g., Hale v. Wolfsen, 276 Cal. App. 2d 285, 81 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1969); Frisell v.
Newman, 71 Wash. 2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967).
93. See generally Stoppello, Federal Regulation of Home Mortgage Settlement Costs:
RESPA and its Alternatives, 63 MINN. L. Rlv. 367 (1979); Whitman, supra note 6.
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tion method. The seller or creditor must disclose pertinent information, including statements about the consumer's legal rights and the concomitant
duties of the retailers, lenders and others with whom they deal.94
Federal legislation applies the disclosure model to the real estate conveyancing process. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974
(RESPA)95 called for a standard form statement of closing costs to be given to
buyers sufficiently in advance of closing- to permit shopping for the best terms
or cost comparison as a means of coping with what Congress believed were excessive closing costs. 97 Criticisms of RESPA, however, led within a year to
amendments which eliminated many of the sanctions for violating the act and
98
somewhat altered the disclosure requirements.
Another legislative scheme calling for disclosure in the real estate context is
truth-in-lending. 99 This was one of the earliest pieces of consumer legislation
adopting the disclosure concept. It attempts to promote the informed use of
consumer credit by forcing disclosure of the actual cost of credit in dollars and
as a percentage rate to consumers. 1° ° Doubt remains about whether the law has
achieved its objectives. 1° 1 Such doubt seems particularly justified in the real
0 2

estate area.1

94. See generally Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 400 (1973). Cf. Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure
and Gobbledygook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63
VA. L. Rv. 841 (1977).
95. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§2601-2617 (1976)).
96. Closing costs had to be disclosed at least 12 days prior to closing. 12 U.S.C. §2605
(repealed by Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-205, §5, 89 Stat. 1157, 1158).
97. 12 U.S.C. §2601 (1976). This understanding was partially based on a 1972 government study. See DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION, REPORT ON MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT COSTS (1972). For a good description of the events
leading to the passage of RESPA see D. BURKE, supra note 15, at 133-53.
98. Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-205, 89 Stat. 1157. For a discussion of the amendments, their substance and effect, see H.R. REP. No. 94-667, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975);
D. BURKE, supra note 15, at 170-77.
99. 15 U.S.C. §§1601-1671 (1976).
100. These disclosures for credit sales not under an open-ended credit plan are required
by 15 U.S.C. §1638(6)(7) (1976). These same disclosures are central to truth-in-lending under
the Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act which becomes effective in March, 1982.
Act of March 31, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, Title VI, §614(a), 94 Stat. 178.
101. Landers & Chandler, The Truth In Lending Act and Variable-Rate Mortgages and
Balloon Notes, 1976 A.B.F. REs. J. 35, 63-66 (1976); Stoppello, supra note 93, at 451-52.
102. Real estate lenders are not subject to the full strength of truth in lending. One important remedy for consumers under truth in lending, the right to rescind a credit transaction under certain circumstances, does not apply in first mortgage loan transactions. 15
U.S.C. §1635(e) (1976). Lenders making loans secured by a first lien on a dwelling for the
purpose of financing the purchase of that dwelling need not disclose the total finance charge
the borrower will pay over the life of the loan. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §226.8(d)(3) (1978). Lenders
may not be anxious to reveal this amount to borrowers because it will likely be several times
the principal amount borrowed. The Truth in Lending Simplification and Reform Act discontinues this benefit for real estate lenders. See Act of March 31, 1980, Pub. L. 96-221, Title
VI, §614(a), 94 Stat. 178. Finally, Regulation Z only requires that the disclosures be made
before the transaction is consummated. 12 C.F.R. §226.8(a) (1978). It is not customary to make
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The principle of disclosure could nevertheless be applied to the real estate
brokerage industry. Brokers could be required by law or regulation to inform
buyers of the agency relationship the broker has directly with some sellers,
through listing agreements, and indirectly with others, through multiple listing
arrangements. The broker would have to explain that he may not volunteer
more information than the owner of the home would have to disclose nor give
advice about the appropriate price or subjective qualities of the houses inspected. If a dual agency approach is adopted, statements could be formulated
for presentation to both parties at the outset of the broker's dealings with each
of them.
Disclosure would reveal to buyers the constraints agency law places on the
broker's actions and disabuse them of the belief that the broker is working for
them. In the absence of a viable comprehensive solution to the problems considered here, disclosure in some form would aid buyers. Brokers and those who
regulate them should give serious attention to the best form of disclosure and
the best time for it. Disclosure, however, cannot solve the more fundamental
problem of providing counsel to buyers. Disclosure helps but it is no cure for
the lack of advice and guidance buyers expect.
Middleman
103
A broker may act as a middleman in a real estate conveyance. This characterization emphasizes the broker's independent objective to earn a commission in the transaction. As a middleman, the broker is limited to bringing the
parties together and may not take an active part in the negotiations for either
party. The middleman posture limits the broker to doing less than either party
expects. 104 Such a constrained role makes the usual commission the broker receives seem exorbitant. Casting the broker as a middleman may cure the conflict of interest problems, but it is overkill, eliminating the substance of the
broker's participation in the conveyancing process.

Buyer's Agent
If buyers require the services and counsel of agents with expertise in real
the truth in lending statement available for inspection more than a day or so prior to closing.
See generally Stoppello, supra note 93, at 452-55. There is little a borrower could do in response to the information at such a late date. Refusing the loan would likely put the buyer
in default of the land sale contract and result in the deposit being lost. Truth in lending
thus does not appear to provide meaningful assistance to buyers seeking a mortgage loan.
103. A broker may claim middleman status to avoid the charge that he acted as agent for
both parties without their consent to a dual agency. Harry M. Fine Realty Co. v. Stiers, 326
S.W.2d 392, 398 (Mo. App. 1959). Because dual agencies can be created, the broker need not
reduce his participation to that of middleman. Mallory v. Watt, 100 Idaho 119, 122, 594 P.2d
629, 632 (1979). An excellent conception of the middleman's role is provided by an early
North Dakota case: "A broker is simply a middleman ... when he has no duty to perform but
to bring the parties together, leaving them to negotiate and to come to an agreement themselves without any aide from him. If he takes . . . any part in the negotiations, however, he
cannot be regarded as a mere middleman, no matter how slight a part it may be." Jensen v.
Bowen, 37 N.D. 352, 358, 164 N.W. 4, 5 (1917).
104. See Stambler & Stein, supra note 12.
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estate, a direct and obvious way to meet the demand is for some brokers to
work exclusively for buyers. Nothing in the law of agency or real estate
brokerage bars such an activity. Indeed, many cases holding brokers responsible
to buyers involve agents employed to find property for buyers rather than to
sell for owners. 105
Because buyer's agents would be a new development in residential real
estate transactions, changes in the manner of conducting business would be
required. A major difficulty would be determining the compensation of the
buyer's agent. To make this agent's duties of loyalty and disclosure clear, his
compensation ought to come solely from the buyer-principal.
If buyers have to pay the same price for a house plus a fee to secure the
loyalty of the broker, they might avoid entering into such agency agreements,
despite the benefits such an arrangement might offer. Obviously, buyer reception of the idea depends on the fee. In the multiple broker situation the selling
broker usually gets the larger share of the commission. For this new concept to
work, therefore, more than an incidental amount will need to be paid by the
buyer because the broker must forego the customary selling broker's percentage
of the commission.
A buyer may pay less for a house if he employs an agent to negotiate directly with the seller and the listing broker, however. A commonly held assumption is that the commission is buried in the sale price and, practically
speaking, paid by the purchaser when a broker is involved in a transaction.
Some buyers explore "for sale by owner" listings expecting to pay less for a
house.106 If the selling broker's share of the commission were not subtracted
from the proceeds the seller received at closing because the purchaser paid for
these services directly, the seller should accept a lower price for his house. The
price of the house would, therefore, be lower by an amount approaching or
equal to the fee paid by the buyer to employ the broker at the outset of the
search process. Costs, therefore, should not inhibit the introduction of a buyer's
agent into the conveyancing process.
Another question to consider is whether enough brokers would undertake
such an activity to make it viable. If a broker could somehow be a buyer's agent
for some clients and continue to list property, the industry might not resist this
change. 10 7 Even if buyers' agents were prohibited from listing property the
concept might still work. So many people hold real estate sales and brokerage
licenses 08 that one could expect a significant number to become buyers' agents
105. E.g., Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927); Emily v. Bayne, 871 S.W.2d
663, 679-71 (Mo. App. 1963); Degner v. Moncel, 6 Wis. 2d 163, 93 N.W.2d 857 (1959).
106. There is an apparent lack of empirical verification of whether buyers save all or
part of the commission by purchasing directly from the seller without the aid of a broker.
Brokers hint that the commission is buried in the price. The National Association of Realtors
gives as a reason for owners to list their homes that: "[I]n a Sale by Owner, the Realtor's
commission is always deducted by the buyer and the seller is left to do all the work for
nothing." NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (OF REALTORS, SALES HANDBOOK 71 (1975).
107. If both roles could be assumed, however, it would be hard to avoid the inherent
problems that were encountered with dual agency in satisfactorily servicing the needs of both

parties.
108.

In California more than 178,000 persons were active in real estate brokerage in 1976
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to capture revenues such activity would generate. Certainly, many details and
questions would have to be carefully thought out before the implementing of
such a radical change in the way residential real estate sales are presently transacted. Given a problem as pervasive as this one, however, imagination and experimentation are necessary.
CONCLUSION

Home buying and selling are important events in the personal lives of most
Americans. Counsel and aid ought to be available for those who want it. Although most real estate brokers understand the significance of their responsibilities and treat both buyer and seller with consideration, the law defining the
broker's role in the conveyancing process is vague and inconsistent with the
understanding of the parties involved. For the sake of brokers, sellers, and
buyers, brokers' duties should be clarified. If possible, the duties should be defined in a way that meets the reasonable expectations of the parties.
The buyer's agent concept provides a useful basis for reform. Without doubt
the broker should also be required to explain clearly to both parties what his
role is in the transaction. Disclosing of the limits of the broker's role should
occur early enough in his relationship with each party to permit either one to
seek additional aid and to decide what to tell the broker and what information
to withhold based on a clear understanding of the broker's duties.
To insure that changes in law and practice are wise, a clearer understanding
of consumers' perceptions of real estate brokers, and brokers' perceptions of
their roles and responsibilities is needed. With such information, intelligent
decisions can be made to solve the persistent problems associated with buying
and selling homes through real estate brokers.
and another 71,000 persons on inactive status. In San Francisco there were a phenomenal 186
licensees per square mile. Owen, supra note 13, at 945.
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